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BANKRUPTCY-CREDITOR'S RIGHT AGAINST ENTIRETY PROPERTY-APPLI-
CABILITY OF STATE LAw WHEN UNITED STATES Is PLAINTIFF-The United 
States as assignee sought a joint judgment on four unsecured promissory 
notes signed by the defendants, who are husband and wife. The proceeds of 
the notes were used to improve real property held by the entireties by the 
defendants. The husband had filed in bankruptcy before the assignment of 
the notes to plaintiff and was discharged from his joint and several liability 
on the promissory notes prior to the commencement of any action on them. 
His estate by the entireties, however, was not used to satisfy any listed debts 
because under state law he had no divisible title which could pass to the 
trustee in bankruptcy.1 The federal district court entered judgment for the 
plaintiff.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, 
judgment set aside and case remanded with instructions to dismiss. Since 
federal courts are not bound to apply state law when the United States is 
plaintiff, the husband's liability on the notes was discharged in bankruptcy 
and his release likewise precluded recovery from his wife. Fetter v. United 
States, (6th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 467. 
The court in the principal case stated that merely because the United 
States was plaintiff3 it was not bound by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins4 
1 In re Berry, (E.D. Mich. 1917) 247 F. 700. See McMullen v. Zabawski, (E.D. Mich. 
1922) 283 F. 552. For a general discussion of the rules governing the relationship of 
creditors to their debtors' entireties property in Michigan, see Bienenfeld, "Creditors v. 
Tenancies by the Entirety," I WAYNE L. R.Ev. 105 (1955). 
2 United States v. Fetter and Fetter, (E.D. Mich. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 10. For a discussion 
of the district court decision, see note, 57 M1cH. L. REv. 607 (1959). 
3 Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. (1958) §1345. 
4304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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to apply state law.5 The court expressly stated that had the suit been 
brought by the original creditor it would have been bound to apply Mich-
igan law which allowed recovery on the notes notwithstanding the hus-
band's discharge in bankruptcy.6 Although it is frequently stated that the 
Erie doctrine has no application where jurisdiction is not based on diver-
sity of citizenship, this in not completely accurate; rather, the applica-
bility of the Erie doctrine depends upon whether a local issue, as con-. 
trasted with a federal issue, is before the court.7 In determining whether an 
issue is federal or local it is more meaningful to talk in terms of the source 
of the right involved, rather than the source of the jurisdiction of the court.s 
Since the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has regularly decided that fed-
eral courts are not bound by state law when the United States sues because 
the subject matter is invariably governed by the Constitution, thus rais-
ing a federal issue.9 This is so even when the United States sues as a 
private party, although the issue raised is not expressly related to a fed-
eral statute or the Constitution.10 The need to be free to develop uniform 
rules of law in certain areas of government operation has apparently led to 
this result.11 The language used by the Supreme Court is broad enough to 
include instances, as in the principal case, where the United States is merely 
an assignee;12 nevertheless, the actual holdings of the Supreme Court do not 
necessarily warrant the inference that the Erie doctrine will not apply in 
cases where the United States is merely an assignee.1 3 In the principal case 
5 Principal case at 470. For a general discussion of the applicability of the Erie doc-
trine, see Gorrell and Weed, "Erie Railroad: Ten Years After," 9 Omo ST. L.J. 276 (1948). 
6 Principal case at 470. 
7 See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §0.305 (3) (1959). See also Newman, "The 
Federal Common Law," 26 DICTA 303 (1949); Snepp, "The Law Applied in the Federal 
Courts," 13 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 165 at 168-169 (1948). 
s Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 
109 (1936). See also London," 'Federal Question' Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion," 
57 M1CH. L. REv. 835 (1959). See, generally, note 7 supra. 
9 Board of Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Royal Indemnity Co. v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 
(1943); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
10 United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra. In cases where no legislative or 
constitutional guide is available "it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule 
of law according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, note 9 
supra, at 367. But see the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. (1958) §1652, which requires 
that state law be applied " ... except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide. . •• " See also comment, 53 CoL. 
L. REv. 991 (1953). 
11 See note 9 supra. 
12 In United States v. County of Allegheny, note 9 supra, at 182, the Court pointed out: 
"Every acquisition, holding or disposition of property by the Federal Government depends 
upon proper exercise of a constitutional grant of power." 
13 In United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra, at 309, the Court in dicta stated 
that federal courts may be bound by the Erie doctrine to apply state law " .•. where the 
government has simply substituted itself for others as successor to rights governed by state 
law .... " Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 571 
expressly recognized the distinction between the United States in its own rights and a 
suit by the United States as assignee, distinguishing Supreme Court cases on this basis. 
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the rights of the United States as assignee of the original creditor were 
dependent upon the rights created by the contract made between the orig-
inal creditor and the defendants. The rights of the creditor were admitted-
ly governed by state law because, although the husband was discharged of 
his joint and several liabilities in federal bankruptcy proceedings, interpreta-
tion of the effect of discharge in these circumstances has been left to the 
state courts.14 Thus, to argue that the claims of the United States were 
ultimately derived from federal law,15 merely because it had authority 
under the Constitution to enter into such transactions, seems quite tenuous. 
Even assuming that the application of state law is not compelled, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that it is often the appropriate law to follow 
where there is no federal statute from which an overriding federal policy 
could be derived or where there is no need for uniformity throughout the 
country.16 The principal case in holding that it was not bound by state law 
did not discuss its possible appropriateness.17 Yet state law would seem to be 
particularly appropriate in this case for two reasons. First, in reaching its de-
cision in the principal case the court was forced to look to two factors 
controlled by state law, the married woman statutes and the unique estate 
of tenancy by the entireties.is Having relied on state law to this extent, 
it seems to follow that the court should go one step farther and apply 
state law entirely. Secondly, whenever the United States is merely an as-
signee, in absence of clear federal policy to the contrary, state law should 
be adopted because otherwise rights and liabilities of prior parties might 
be unforeseeably altered by the unilateral act of one party who assigns his 
interest. 
James Cripe 
14 Recognition of this fact is implicit in the court's reasoning in the principal case at 
470 that under Michigan law a discharge in bankruptcy does not preclude a joint judg-
ment. See also note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 607 (1959). 
15 The holding in the principal case that under federal law a discharge in bankruptcy 
of the husband precludes a judgment against the wife seems difficult to reconcile with the 
rather express langnage of §34 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides: "The liability of a 
person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt 
shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt." 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. 
(1958) §34. 
16 United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra, at 308-309; Royal Indemnity Co. v. 
United States, note 9 supra, at 297. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, note 9 supra, 
at 367. 
17 Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. United Distillers Products Corp., (2d Cir. 1956) 
229 F. (2d) 665, was relied on by the court in the principal case as authority for holding 
that state law was not binding. But in that case it was also held that state law, though not 
binding, was appropriate. 
18 Principal case at 468-469. 
